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SULLNS v. ALLSTATE: LEAD PAINT AND THE GROWING AMBI-
GUITY OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
As many as three million children are at risk for lead paint
poisoning.' Many older homes contain lead-based paints on interior
surfaces.2 Exposure to lead paint can cause children to develop
learning disabilities and behavioral problems, as well as adversely af-
fect the health of pregnant women.' Damages arising from lead
paint exposure can be substantial because of its severe negative
health effects.4 Consequently, landlords often attempt to procure in-
surance policies that protect against lead paint liability.
5
Generally, when an insurance policy covers a certain type of
claim, the insurer has the duty to defend the insured against cov-
ered claims. 6 The duty to defend ordinarily assures the insured of
adequate resources to defend all claims brought against it that are
within or potentially within the scope of the coverage provided by
the policy.
7
1. See Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C.A. §
4851 (West 1995) (noting national lead paint statistics and Congressional find-
ings); see also Jane Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm on Lead-Based Paint: From
Code Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REV. 511, 515-19 (1994).
2. See Thomas J. Miceli, et al., Protecting Children from Lead-Based Paint Poisoning:
Should Landlords Bear the Burden?, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 4 (1995); Karla
L. Franken, Comment, Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Liability: Wisconsin Realtors,
Residential Property Sellers, and Landlords Beware, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 550, 560
(1994).
3. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4851; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, § 2-301(7)(i) (1995)
(discussing legislative findings regarding Maryland's Housing Rehabilitation
Program).
4. See, e.g., Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, The Lead Poisoning Challenge: An Approach for
California and Other States, 21 HARV. ENVrL L. REv. 387, 387 (1997); Schukoske,
supra note 1, at 515-16.
5. See infra notes 227-46, 254-74.
6. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (discussing the duty to defend
and the duty to indemnify).
7. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md. 98, 104-05, 651 A.2d 859, 862
(1995) (holding that an insurer had a duty to defend an insured when the in-
sured could have potentially been acting in self-defense, rather than commit-
ting an intentional tort); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 408,
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If an insurer does not want to pay to defend particular tortious
acts by the insured, the insurance company can explicitly exclude
coverage in its policy for those types of tort claims.8 The substantial
exposure to liability for environmental pollution claims caused
many insurers to include clauses in their insurance policies that lim-
ited coverage for damages caused by pollution-pollution exclusion
clauses.9 Pollution exclusion clauses attempt to limit or eliminate
the insurer's duty to defend and indemnify the insured against
claims involving pollution. 10 When the alleged damages are not
caused by pollution, the pollution exclusion clause does not apply,
and the insurer may have a duty to defend and indemnify the
insured."
While causation is often an issue in pollution exclusion clause
litigation, 12 a more fundamental issue that courts must resolve is
whether the insured's conduct fell within the definition of pollu-
tion. 3 When the insured's conduct is not pollution, the pollution
exclusion clause does not apply to bar the insured from coverage or
the insurer's duty to defend.' 4 In Sullins v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' 5
the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether lead paint
was a pollutant within the meaning of an insurance policy's pollu-
tion exclusion clause. 6 Maryland's highest court found that lead
paint did not fit the definition of a pollutant and, therefore, was
not precluded by the clause.
7
347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975); see also 7C JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4683 (Walter E Berdal ed., 1979); Andrew Janquitto, Insurer's Duty
to Defend in Maryland, 18 U. Balt. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1988).
8. See, e.g., Pepper Indus. v. Home Ins. Co., 134 Cal. Rptr. 904, 908 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) (stating that if the insurance company intended to "exclude coverage
for damage resulting from such incidents, it could have done so by the use of
a few precise and specific words.").
9. See infra notes 104-41 and accompanying text.
10. See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSUR-
ANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES, § 10.02, at 405 (8th ed. 1995) (discussing the devel-
opment of the pollution exclusion and the ensuing litigation).
11. See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Look-
ing Glass, 74 GEO. LJ. 1237, 1293-94 (1986).
12. See 7A APPLEMAN, supra note 7, § 4525, at 225 (Lexis L. Pub. Supp. 1998).
13. See id. § 4524, at 211, 213-14 nn.3-4.
14. See id.
15. 340 Md. 503, 667 A.2d 617 (1995).
16. See id. at 504, 667 A.2d at 620. Sullins involved a certified question from the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland. See id. at 506, 667
A.2d at 618.
17. See id. at 513, 518, 667 A.2d at 621-22, 624.
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In the underlying case, a tenant brought suit against her land-
lord, the Sullinses, seeking damages for injuries that her infant suf-
fered as a result of ingesting lead paint." Subsequently, the insurer,
Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) brought a declaratory judg-
ment action in federal court, requesting the court to declare that it
did not have the duty to defend the landlords in the lead paint
suit.' 9 Allstate argued that it had no duty to defend because lead
paint fell within the pollution exclusion clause.2 0 In turn, the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified
the issue to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
2'
The Court of Appeals of Maryland found Allstate's pollution
exclusion clause ambiguous.22 The ambiguity could not be resolved
by examining the extrinsic and parole evidence, therefore, the con-
tract was " 'construed against the insurer as the drafter of the con-
tract.' ",23 Ultimately, the Sullins court held that the pollution exclu-
sion clause was ineffective in the underlying lead paint suit.
2 4
The Sullins court's decision was in line with the majority of ju-
risdictions that have addressed substantively similar issues.25 As the
Sullins opinion demonstrates, pollution exclusion clauses are not
the most effective means to exclude lead paint claims from insur-
18. See id. at 507, 667 A.2d at 618-19.
19. See id. at 508, 667 A.2d at 619.
20. See id. See generally Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 405, 347
A.2d 842, 848 (1975) ("A declaratory judgment action prior to the trial of a
tort action against the insured may under some circumstances be a valuable
means of resolving questions of policy coverage .... An early resolution
could avoid unnecessary expense and delay to the parties."); Janquitto, supra
note 7, at 53 (stating that the duty to defend places "the burden on the in-
surer to bring a declaratory judgment action to determine its obligation").
21. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 506, 667 A.2d at 618.
22. See id. at 508-10, 667 A.2d at 619-20.
23. Id. at 509, 667 A.2d at 619 (quoting Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life, 315 Md. 761,
766-67, 556 A.2d 1135 (1989)); see Mutual, Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v.
Vollmer, 306 Md. 243, 251, 508 A.2d 130, 134 (1986) (holding that if ambigu-
ity exists after review of parole and extrinsic evidence, the ambiguity is to be
construed against the insurer (citing St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 198-99, 438 A.2d 282, 288 (1981)); C & H Plumbing &
Heating, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 264 Md. 510, 512, 287 A.2d 238, 239
(1972); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. DeJames, 256 Md. 717, 720, 261
A.2d 747, 749 (1970);Josey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 252 Md. 274, 279, 250 A.2d 256,
259 (1969); Mateer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 247 Md. 643, 648, 233 A.2d 797, 800
(1967).
24. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 518, 667 A.2d at 624.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 142-204.
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ance coverage. Instead, insurers that do not want to provide cover-
age for lead paint injuries should include an explicit provision in
their policies memorializing this intent.
26
This Note identifies and analyzes the key issues examined by
the court of appeals in Sullins. The Background section provides a
directory to some of the important issues for practitioners who liti-
gate matters involving insurance coverage for pollution claims.
2 7
Part IV criticizes the Sullins court's willingness to side with an in-




Insurance disputes are unique because they involve three par-
ties-the insurer, the insured, and the person asserting a claim
against the insured.29 Underlying all insurance policies are ideas of
risk management3 ° and the transfer of risk.31 Insurance policies are
commonly referred to as contracts of adhesion because they are
usually standardized contracts drawn up by the insurer that leave
the insured with little bargaining power.
32
26. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 29-271 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 295-315 and accompanying text.
29. See Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 476-77 (1996) ("In no other area of the law are
parties routinely represented by counsel selected and paid by a third party
whose interests may differ from those of the individual or entity the attorney
is defending."). This "tripartite relationship" and the insurance defense duties
that flow from it have been referred to as " 'deeply and unavoidably vexing.' "
Id. at 477 (quoting Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the
Company or the Insured?, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1583, 1587 (1994)).
30. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw § 1.3, at 8 (1988).
31. See id. § 1.1 (b), at 3 ("The articulation of a generally applicable definition of
insurance has proven to be a very difficult task."). Although there is a prob-
lem in defining what exactly insurance is, it is basically understood to mean a
contractual agreement whereby one party agrees to assume risk upon the oc-
currence of an event. See id.
32. An adhesion contract is usually a standard form submitted to one party who
has a little or no bargaining power in the contract drafting. See Standard Oil
Co. of Cal. v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir. 1965). The contract is
often offered on a "take it or leave it" basis. See id.; see also Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 219, 222 (Conn. 1988). "[I]nsurance contracts are
contracts of adhesion because [t]he contract is drawn up by the insurer, and
the insured, who merely 'adheres' to it, has little choice as to its terms." Id.
(citing Edwin Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV.
198, 222 (1919)) (alteration in original); see KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 30,
478 [Vol. 27
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As explained by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Cheney v.
Bell National Life Insurance Co.,33 all contracts, including insurance
policies, are interpreted according to the "four corners" rule.34 In
Cheney, the spouse of the insured sought payment under a life insur-
ance policy.35 The insured contracted Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) from a blood transfusion that was necessary for
hemophilia treatment, and later died.36 Under the terms of the pol-
icy, the insurer excluded coverage for any loss caused by "medical
or surgical treatment" of a "sickness or disease." 37 The court found
that "hemophilia [was] a 'disease' within the commonly accepted
meaning of that word, and therefore within the meaning of [the]
insurance policy."38 Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled in favor
of the insurer, emphasizing the rule that Maryland courts must ex-
amine the four corners of a contract to determine the parties' in-
tent.39 The court noted that, unlike other jurisdictions, Maryland
does not follow the rule that insurance policies are to be construed
"most strongly against the insurer."40
A. The Duty to Defend
Insurers owe their insureds two contractual duties-the duty to
at 125-26 ("Insureds often learn, as a result of ... an experience with an in-
surance coverage problem, that they had a deplorably inadequate understand-
ing of the insurance product that was purchased.").
33. 315 Md. 761, 556 A.2d 1135 (1989).
34. See id. at 767, 556 A.2d at 1138; see also Kasten Constr. Co. v. Rod Enters., 268
Md. 318, 301 A.2d 12 (1971) (discussing ambiguous contracts). The Kasten
court explained that the intent of the parties must be addressed when inter-
preting an ambiguous contract and viewed from the standpoint of the reason-
able person-"[Tlhe true test of what is meant is not what the parties to the
contract intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of
the parties would have thought it meant." Id. at 319, 301 A.2d at 18 (citing
U.S.I.F. Triangle v. Rockwood Dev. Co., 261 Md. 526, 270 A.2d 487 (1971),
Seldeen v. Canby, 259 Md. 526, 270 A.2d 485 (1970), and Katz v. Pratt St. Re-
alty, 257 Md. 103, 262 A.2d 540 (1970)).
35. See Cheney, 315 Md. at 763, 556 A.2d at 1137.
36. See id. at 763, 556 A.2d at 1136-37.
37. Id. at 763, 556 A.2d at 1136.
38. Id. at 770, 556 A.2d at 1140.
39. See id. at 766-67, 556 A.2d at 1138 ("Rather, following the rule applicable to
the construction of contracts generally, we hold that the intention of the par-
ties is to be ascertained if reasonably possible from the policy as a whole.").
40. Id. at 766, 556 A.2d at 1138. In most jurisdictions, ambiguous insurance poli-
cies are to be resolved against the drafter of the policy. See KEETON & WIDISS,
supra note 30, § 6.3(a)(2).
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defend and the duty to indemnify.4 Initially, courts look to the four
corners of the insurance policy at issue to determine the insurer's
duty to defend.42 To trigger the duty to defend, the claim asserted
against the insured must first fall within the insurance policy's cov-
erage. 43 Generally, the insurer's duty to defend is "triggered" when
an injury occurs during the coverage period. 44
It is well established in Maryland, and other jurisdictions, that
an insurer's duty to defend is broader than and separate from its
duty to pay or indemnify.45 The duty to defend arises when there is
a potentiality of coverage-a mere potentiality of the duty to indem-
nify.46 An insurer has a duty to defend even if the suit against the
insured would be unsuccessful or groundless.47 Therefore, the mere
fact that damages proven at trial might fall outside the policy will
41. See Richmond, supra note 29, at 477.
42. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 5.01, at 139 (citing Western World
Ins. Co. v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558, 562 (4th Cir. 1986)). Some
courts require the insured to demonstrate that the duty to defend was ex-
pressly provided for in the policy. See id. at 131 (citing Outboard Marine Corp.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1976), Mattocks v. Daylin,
Inc., 452 F. Supp. 512, 514 (W.D. Pa. 1978), and All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel
Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 163 (N.D. Ind. 1971)).
43. See generally David S. Garbett, Comment, The Duty to Defend Clause in a Liability
Insurance Policy: Should the Exclusive Pleading Test Be Replaced?, 36 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 235, 237 (1982) (discussing the duty to defend under Florida law).
"When the allegations of the complaint against the insured set forth facts
outside the scope of ... coverage, or facts that fall under an exclusionary pro-
vision which negates coverage, the insurer will generally have no duty to de-
fend." Id.
44. See Lee H. Ogburn, The Progression of Trigger Litigation in Maryland-Determin-
ing the Appropriate Trigger of Coverage, Its Limitations, and Ramifications, 53 MD. L.
REV. 220 (1994) (analyzing when the duty to defend is triggered, and address-
ing the "injury-in-fact" trigger theory adopted by the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland).
45. See American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1551
(E.D. Mich. 1984) (discussing Michigan Law); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 112
Md. App. 472, 685 A.2d 858 (1996); see also Susan Randall, Redefining the In-
surer's Duty to Defend, 2 Conn. Ins. L.J. 221, 244 (1997) ("A typical analysis of
the duty to defend consists of the court's recitation of the complaint rule, the
statement that the duty to defend is broader than, separate from, and indepen-
dent of, the duty to indemnify, and a description of the policy's coverage." (em-
phasis added)).
46. See infra notes 63-69 (discussing the potentiality of coverage issue discussed by
the court of appeals); see also OSTRAGER & NEwMAN, supra note 10, § 5.02, at
133.
47. See 44 Am. JuR. 2D Insurance § 1539, at 420-21 (1969).
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not excuse an insurance company from its duty to defend.48
1. The Exclusive Pleading Rule
In Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,49 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit established the rule for deciding
what evidence courts may look to in determining whether an in-
surer has the duty to defend.50 In Judge Learned Hand's majority
opinion, he explained that an insurer has a duty to defend when a
plaintiff files a claim against an insured that falls within the scope
of coverage.5 1 Judge Learned Hand formulated what is commonly
referred to as the exclusive pleading rule, which "holds that an in-
surer's defense obligation is determined solely by the allegations
against the insured in the claimant's pleadings. ' 52 The Lee court
ruled that if one could comprehend that the complaint alleges an
injury that could possibly be within the policy's coverage, the prom-
ise to defend must be construed to include this injury until it is
clear that it does not.
5 3
48. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing the potentiality of cov-
erage rule in Maryland); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 5.02, at
133.
49. 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949).
50. See id. at 750. Lee was a store patron who, at the invitation of the store owner,
walked into an elevator and fell to the bottom of the shaft. See id. The store
owner's insurance policy contained a provision stating that the insurer was not
liable for incidents that occurred as a result of the store owner's "use" of any
elevators. See id. A dispute arose between the insured and the insurer over
whether the store owner used the elevator. See id. at 751. The store owner ar-
gued that it was not using the elevator when one of its patrons fell down the
elevator shaft. See id. The insurer claimed that the store owner's act of inviting
the patron into the elevator constituted use of the elevator, and was not cov-
ered by the insurance policy. See id.
51. See id. In Lee, the insurance policy included a provision requiring the insurer
to "defend . . .any suit against the [i]nsured alleging injury, sickness, disease
or destruction covered by [the] [p]olicy . . .even if such suit is groundless,
false or fraudulent." Id. (alterations in original). Although the contract em-
ployed broad language in defining the insurer's duty to defend, the court im-
posed a threshold requirement that the injury must be of a type covered by
the policy. See id. at 751-52.
52. Janquitto, supra note 7, at 7 ("Under this rule, information extrinsic to the
pleadings is not relevant in determining the insurer's defense obligations.");
see Lee, 178 F.2d at 751 ("[I]t is irrelevant that the insurer may get information
from the insured, or from any one [sic] else, which indicates, or even demon-
strates, that the injury is not in fact 'covered."').
53. See Lee, 178 F.2d at 753.
1998]
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2. The Exclusive Pleading Rule's Effect in Federal Court
The duty to defend, as determined under the exclusive plead-
ing rule, places a greater burden on insurers litigating in federal
court because of the notice pleading structure of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.5 4 Notice pleading merely requires a party to allege
facts sufficient to notify another party of a claim or defense.5 5 No-
tice pleading does not require factually specific allegations in that
the "pleader need not . ..worry about the particular form of the
statement or that it fails to allege a specific fact to cover every ele-
ment of the substantive law involved. ' 56 Therefore, an insurer is
often unable to demonstrate that the underlying suit does not fall
within the insured's policy through the pleadings alone.
5 7
The exclusive pleading rule prevents an insurer from using any-
thing but the plaintiff's complaint to demonstrate that it has no
duty to defend. 58 However, situations arise when the plaintiffs com-
plaint does not clearly allege facts that bring the claim within the
range of the insurance policy's coverage. 9 In these situations, the
insurer's obligation to defend the insured becomes unclear.
60 Most
federal courts follow the rule that when "a complaint, however am-
biguous, may be read as premising liability on . . .grounds . . .po-
tentially or arguably covered by the policy, the insured is entitled to a
54. See Janquitto, supra note 7, at 37-38 & n.215 ("The stricter pleading require-
ments of the past gave an insurer substantially more information on which to
decide a duty-to-defend question. The continued viability of the exclusive
pleading rule in light of the notice theory underlying current pleading sys-
tems has been questioned by both commentators and the courts.") (footnotes
omitted); Randall, supra note 45, at 243-44 (' [S]ince the advent of notice
pleading there will likely be broad ambiguous claims made against the insured
making it more difficult for the insurer to determine whether the insurance
policy covers the claims."') (quoting Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp.
1064, 1068 (D. Idaho 1986)).
55. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.7, at 253 (2d ed. 1993).
See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68 (5th ed.
1994) (discussing the notice pleading requirement of the federal rules and
the landmark decision in Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944)).
56. WRIGHT, supra note 55, at 254.
57. SeeJanquitto, supra note 7, at 37-38; cf. Allison v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 907 F.2d
645, 649 (7th Cir. 1990) ("In a system of notice pleading, an insurer may be
called on to defend without a complete articulation of the claim against its
policyholders.").
58. SeeJanquitto, supra note 7, at 7.
59. See Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975); Ran-
dall, supra note 45, at 243-44.
60. See Randall, supra note 45, at 243-44.
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defense. ' 61 As a result, a general, nondescript, or vague claim filed
against an insured may trigger the insurer's duty to defend whereas
under more stringent pleading requirements, the absence of a duty
to defend might be evident from the outset.
62
3. How to Determine the Duty to Defend in Maryland
The Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed what must exist to
create a duty to defend in Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Co.63 In
Brohawn, the insured allegedly assaulted two nursing home employ-
ees while she attempted to remove her grandmother from the nurs-
ing home.64 The nursing home employees sued Brohawn, alleging
counts of negligence and intentional tort.65 The insurance policy
provided coverage for negligence, but not for intentional torts.
66
The court of appeals held that "[e]ven if a tort plaintiff does not al-
lege facts which clearly bring the claim within or without the policy
coverage, the insurer still must defend if there is a potentiality that
the claim could be covered by the policy."
67
Thus, under Brohawn the court of appeals extended the in-
surer's duty to defend to all situations that create a potentiality, or as
one commentator suggested, even the possibility of coverage. 6 How-
ever, the Brohawn court did not address how courts should deter-
mine whether a potentiality of coverage exists.
69
Subsequently, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Pryseski,
7u
the court of appeals developed a framework for determining
whether the potentiality for coverage exists.7' Pryseski involved a sex-
ual harassment suit brought against an employee of a life insurance
61. Donnelly v. Transportation Ins. Co., 589 F.2d 761, 767 (4th Cir. 1978) (empha-
sis added); see also Randall, supra note 45, at 226-27.
62. See Allison, 907 F.2d at 649.
63. 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842.
64. See id. at 398-99, 347 A.2d at 845.
65. See id. at 400, 347 A.2d at 846. Originally, the nursing home employees sued
Brohawn alleging an intentional tort. See id. at 399-400, 347 A.2d at 846. The
complaint was later amended to include a count for negligence. See id.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 408, 347 A.2d at 850 (citing USF&G v. National Paving and Contracting
Co., 228 Md. 40, 54, 178 A.2d 872, 879 (1962)) (emphasis added).
68. SeeJanquitto, supra note 7, at 13-14 (stating that perhaps the better term for
the potentiality rule established by the Brohawn court would be the "possibil-
ity" rule).
69. See id. at 17.
70. 292 Md. 187, 438 A.2d 282 (1981).
71. See id. at 193, 438 A.2d at 285.
19981
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company.72 The insurer contended that the employee's tortious acts
were not within the scope of his employment and that the policy
did not cover "willful acts in violation of the penal statute or ordi-
nance." 73 For these two reasons, the insurer argued that it owed
Pryseski no duty to defend.
74
The Pryseski court announced that in order to determine
whether an insurer has a duty to defend the insured, two questions
must be answered. 75 First, the court must determine what acts are
covered under the policy.76 Second, the court must decide whether
the facts alleged in the complaint potentially bring the claim within
the policy's coverage.
77
Under the first prong of the Pryseski test, courts are to focus on
the language contained in the policy; the second prong focuses on
the allegations in the complaint against the insured. 78 Thus, Pryseski
created a comparison test by which a deciding court normally must
first determine the scope and limits of an insurance policy before
addressing the potentiality of coverage.79 Once a court determines
72. See id. at 190-91, 438 A.2d at 284.
73. Id. at 191, 438 A.2d at 284.
74. See id. at 191-93, 438 A.2d at 283-85.
75. See id. at 193, 438 A.2d at 285.
76. See id. The Pryseski court remanded the case to determine, through extrinsic
evidence, the meaning of "occurrence" under the policy. See id. at 200, 438
A.2d at 289.
77. See id. at 193, 438 A.2d at 285; see also Home Exterminating Co. v. Zurich-
American Ins. Group, 921 F. Supp. 318, 321 (D. Md. 1996) (applying the test
provided by the Pryseski court as well as following the rationale provided by
the Sullins court); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 288 Md. 428, 435-36,
418 A.2d 1187, 1191 (1987) (applying a similar test to that relied on by the
Pryseski court in determining whether an insurer owed the duty to defend in a
tort suit arising out of an automobile accident involving the insured).
78. See Pryseski, 292 Md. at 193, 438 A.2d at 285.
79. See id.; see alsoJanquitto, supra note 7, at 18-20 (characterizing the standard an-
nounced by the Pryseski court as a "comparison test"). The Pryseski court set
forth the following line of reasoning:
The first question focuses upon the language and requirements of
the policy, and the second question focuses upon the allegations of
the tort suit. At times these two questions involve separate and distinct
matters, and at other times they are intertwined, perhaps involving an
identical issue.
The "rule" applied by the Court of Special Appeals in this case,
namely that the insurer has a duty to defend if the allegations of the
tort suit raise a "potentiality" that coverage exists, is generally appli-
cable only to the second question set forth above. It may, however, be
applicable to an issue raised under the first question set forth above if
[Vol. 27
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the scope of the policy's coverage, it will compare that with the alle-
gations in the underlying tort claim and determine if there is the
that issue must also be resolved in the underlying tort suit.
Normally, however, when the question of'coverage or defenses
under the language or requirements of the insurance policy is sepa-
rate and distinct from the issues involved in the tort suit, the "potenti-
ality rule" relied on by the court below has no application.
Pryseski, 292 Md. at 193-94, 438 A.2d at 285-86 (emphasis added).
Subsequently, in Northern Assurance Co. of America v. EDP Floors, Inc.,
311 Md. 217, 533 A.2d 682 (1987), the court of appeals explained this passage
in Pryseski:
As we stated in Pryseski, however, when, as here, the question of coverage
or exclusion under the language of the insurance policy is separate
and distinct from the issues involved in the tort suit, the "potentiality
rule" normally has no application. To apply the "potentiality rule" in
this case as [the insured] seeks would in effect create a canon of in-
surance contract interpretation that gives every benefit of the doubt
to the insured, in contravention of our many holdings that the un-
ambiguous language in an insurance contract is to be afforded its or-
dinary and accepted meaning.
Id. at 226, 533 A.2d at 686 (emphasis added).
As one commentator aptly recognized, the two lines of inquiries in the
comparison test should remain mutually exclusive elements of a court's analy-
sis. SeeJanquitto, supra note 7, at 21. However, cases arise when facts disputed
in the pleadings must be resolved before the court can determine whether the
insurer has a duty to defend. See id. Even in these intertwined cases, there is no
need for the court to apply the potentiality test to the initial inquiry to deter-
mine the policy's coverage. See id. at 21-22 (explaining that dicta in Pryseski
confused a test of insurance coverage with a test of contract construction).
When the issues are intertwined, a court should apply the potentiality test only
to the second inquiry--do the facts alleged in the complaint potentially bring
the claim within the policy's coverage? See id. The net effect, however, is that
the potentiality test controls the entire framework because the second inquiry
ultimately controls the final outcome.
Despite the sound logic noted above, the same commentator suggested
that the Northern Assurance court "specifically rejected the application of the
potentiality rule to the first prong of the comparison test." Id. at 22. The com-
mentator made this implication by quoting an expurgated portion of the pas-
sage in Northern Assurance that is reprinted above. See id. This misconstrues the
court's holding.
The Northern Assurance court simply reiterated that the potentiality rule
should never be applied to the first inquiry of the Pryseski framework when
that inquiry is separate and distinct from the second inquiry. See Northern Assur-
ance, 311 Md. at 226, 533 A.2d at 686. When cases involve intertwined inquir-
ies, the dicta of PIyseski quoted above could still operate. See id. Thus, despite
the arguably illogical nature of applying the potentiality rule to the first prong
of Pryseski, the Northern Assurance court did not foreclose this possibility.
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potentiality for coverage. 80
However, assessing the potentiality of coverage is often compli-
cated because of the ambiguity in the insurance policy at issue. 81 As
a result, situations arise when the potentiality of coverage is un-
clear.82 In these situations, extrinsic evidence may be consulted,
however, any doubt that remains as to the potentiality of coverage is
interpreted in favor of the insured. 83 Thus, in Maryland, if ambigu-
ity remains after examining extrinsic evidence, the policy will be in-
terpreted against the insurer as the policy's drafter.84
4. Using Extrinsic Evidence
Pryseski bifurcates the duty to defend analysis. 85 The first line of
inquiry directs the court to look solely to the terms, conditions, and
defenses set forth in the insurance policy.86 From the policy alone,
the court must determine what acts by the insured entitle the in-
sured to the duty to defend. 87 If the policy's terms are unambigu-
80. SeeJanquitto, supra note 7, at 21.
81. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Marks Rentals Inc., 288 Md. 428, 433, 418 A.2d 1187,
1189 (1980) (explaining that ambiguity exists in an insurance policy if the pol-
icy's language is susceptible to more than one meaning).
82. See, e.g., supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
83. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md. 98, 651 A.2d 859 (1995); see also
JOHN D. CALAMARI AND JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRACrs § 3-9, at 166
(3d ed. 1987) (defining extrinsic evidence as a very broad term including "not
only prior and contemporaneous agreements but also surrounding circum-
stances (e.g., market conditions), evidence of subjective intention, what the
parties said to each other with respect to meaning and customs, course of
dealing and course of performance."). Cochran involved a policy clause that
did not provide for a defense for certain intentional torts committed by the
insured. See Cochran, 337 Md. at 101, 651 A.2d at 861. The insured contended
his conduct was an act of self-defense, which was an act covered under his lia-
bility policy. See id. The Cochran court held that the extrinsic evidence-the as-
sertions of self-defense that the insured made to the lower court-were admis-
sible to establish a potentiality of coverage. See id. at 112, 651 A.2d at 866.
Although it was not clear from the court's opinion, the Cochran court inti-
mated that these assertions were made in the insured's Answer to the underly-
ing suit. See id. at 101 n.2, 651 A.2d at 861 n.2.
84. See Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, 327 Md. 1, 607 A.2d 537 (1992)
(citing Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Vollmer, 306 Md. 243, 251,
508 A.2d 130, 134 (1986)).
85. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 193, 438 A.2d 282,
285 (1981).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 194, 438 A.2d at 286.
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ous, the inquiry ends.88
Only when the relevant portion of the insurance policy is am-
biguous, must the court attempt to construe the meaning of the
policy.8 9 In doing so, the court may look to extrinsic evidence prof-
fered by the insurer or the insured. 90 If the ambiguity cannot be re-
solved by extrinsic evidence, the policy must be construed against
the drafter, which is generally the insurer.91
The second line of inquiry under Pryseski directs the court to
view the plaintiff's complaint in the underlying suit.92 The court
must compare the facts alleged in the complaint with the acts cov-
ered under the policy.93 If the facts alleged in the complaint demon-
strate that the insured's acts are potentially covered by the policy,
the inquiry ends and the court must instruct the insurer of its duty
to defend. 94 The insurer is not permitted to "use extrinsic evidence
to contest coverage under an insurance policy if the . . . complaint
establishes a potentiality of coverage." 9 When the facts alleged in
the complaint do not clearly demonstrate that the insured's acts are
potentially covered under the policy, the inquiry becomes more
complex.
Maryland courts have slightly modified the exclusive pleading
rule in this area.96 In doing so, Maryland courts developed a double
standard. Under Maryland precedent, if a complaint demonstrates
that there is a potentiality of coverage, an insurer cannot use extrin-
sic evidence to defeat this showing.97 This comports with the exclu-
88. See Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 226, 533
A.2d 682, 687 (1987) ("[T]he unambiguous language in an insurance contract
is to be afforded its ordinary and accepted meaning."); see also Cheney v. Bell
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 767, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1989) (discussing
the four corners rule).
89. See Pryseski, 292 Md. at 194, 438 A.2d at 286.
90. See id. at 198, 438 A.2d at 288 ("[I]n such a situation, extrinsic evidence is ad-
missible at trial to show the parties' intent and to show whether the term does
or does not have a particular trade usage.").
91. See id. at 194, 198, 200, 438 A.2d at 286, 288, 289.
92. See id. at 193, 438 A.2d at 285.
93. SeeJanquitto, supra note 7, at 21.
94. See id.
95. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md. 98, 107, 651 A.2d 859, 863-64
(1995).
96. See id. at 107, 651 A.2d at 863-64. But seejanquitto, supra note 7, at 8 ("Mary-
land has recognized the exclusive pleading rule. One court has even called it
a black letter rule of Maryland insurance law, and exceptions to or deviations
from the rule have been rejected repeatedly.").
97. See Cochran, 337 Md. at 107, 651 A.2d at 863-64.
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sive pleading rule.98 However, if a complaint does not demonstrate
that there is a potentiality of coverage, the insured is permitted to
use extrinsic evidence to demonstrate that there is a potentiality of
coverage. 99 This violates the exclusive pleading rule.1° °
Naturally, this breakdown begs the following question: If the
complaint fails to demonstrate a potentiality of coverage, may the
insurer use extrinsic evidence to demonstrate a lack of potentiality?
Pryseski and its progeny do not address this specific inquiry.'0' The
insured is definitely permitted to resort to extrinsic evidence to
demonstrate a potentiality of coverage. 102 Thus, if courts prevent the
insurer from resorting to extrinsic evidence, the double standard
continues.
If the insurer can use extrinsic evidence to demonstrate a lack
of potentiality of coverage, but the extrinsic evidence is unconvinc-
ing, the duty to defend will likely exist. The duty to defend is likely
to exist because Maryland courts hold that "where a potentiality of
coverage is uncertain from the allegations of a complaint, any
doubt must be resolved in favor of the insured."'0 3
Outside of the controversies surrounding the duty to defend,
coverage controversies generally focus on the meaning of the terms
of the contract. In particular, many insurance policies explicitly pre-
clude coverage for certain acts by the insured. The next section of
this Note examines one exclusion in particular-the pollution
exclusion.
98. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
99. See Cochran, 337 Md. at 110, 651 A.2d at 865 (explaining that allowing an in-
sured to use extrinsic evidence to demonstrate potentiality of coverage is con-
sistent with the public policy concern that the insured pays premiums specifi-
cally for the promise to be defended). The burden is on the insured to
demonstrate a "reasonable potential that the issue triggering coverage will be
generated at trial." Id. at 112, 651 A.2d at 866.
100. See supra notes 52 and accompanying text.
101. The Cochran court noted: "Brohawn in no way intimates that reference to
outside sources is prohibited if that reference is necessary to determine
whether there is a potentiality of coverage under an insurance policy where
the tort plaintiff's complaint neither conclusively establishes nor negates a po-
tentiality of coverage." Cochran, 337 Md. at 108, 651 A.2d at 864. However,
Cochran makes no mention of what evidence the insurer may introduce. In-
stead, the Cochran court cited precedent from other jurisdictions that impose
an affirmative duty on the insurer to seek extrinsic evidence demonstrating
that it has the duty to defend. See id. at 109, 651 A.2d at 865 (citing Spruill
Motors Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 512 P.2d 403, 407 (Kan. 1973)).
102. See id. at 110, 651 A.2d at 865.
103. Id. at 107, 651 A.2d at 863-64.
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B. The Evolution of the Pollution Exclusion Clause
Historically, the insurance industry attempted to limit its expo-
sure to the heavy financial burden associated with pollution
claims.1 04 The industry memorialized its efforts in Comprehensive
General Liability (CGL) policies-standardized insurance policies
adopted industry-wide. 0 5 Often courts interpreted CGLs in a man-
ner inconsistent with the insurance industry's efforts. 0 6 In part, this
has resulted in the industry's current effort to exclude pollution
coverage entirely through the "absolute" pollution exclusion
clause. 0 17 Before the advent of the absolute pollution exclusion
clause, however, pollution-related insurance policies evolved
through four stages. 08
Initially, insurance policies did not contain pollution exclusion
clauses. 0 9 The first type of coverage was "accident-based."" 0 To in-
surers, only sudden discharges that occurred at a fixed moment in
time were considered "accidents" covered by accident-based poli-
cies."' Thus, the policies covered certain accidental pollution, but
insurers did not consider gradual pollution to be an accident."
2
However, the courts formulated a variety of definitions for the word
"accident." 1 3 This led to unpredictable, fragmented precedents,
104. See Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 102 Md. App. 45, 50, 648 A.2d 1047,
1049 (1994) (discussing the history of the pollution exclusion clause).
105. See, e.g., Thomas E. Muluihill, Insurance Coverage for Copyright Violations under a
Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 529 PRACTISING L. INST. PAT. 143, 145
(1998); cf. Melody A. Hamel, Comment, The 1970 Pollution Exclusion in Compre-
hensive General Liability Policies: Reasons for Interpretations in Favor of Coverage in
1996 and Beyond, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 1083, 1101-02 (1996) ("[C]ooperation among
insurers for standard policy language is possible because the insurance indus-
try, since 1948, has enjoyed a congressional exemption from most federal anti-
trust prohibitions.").
106. See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1240.
107. See 7A APpIvmtA, supra note 7,, § 4525 (Lexis L. Pub. Supp. 1998).
108. See Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 513-15, 667 A.2d 617, 622 (1995);
see also Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1241 (detailing the first three stages).
109. See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1241.
110. See id.; see also Hamel, supra note 105, at 1102.
111. See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1241-42; cf. Hamel, supra note 105, at 1102
("Although undefined in the policy, 'accident' . . . was generally thought of as
a 'boom' event where the cause and effect (damages) happened simultane-
ously.").
112. See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1241-42.
113. See id. at 1243-44. Typically, courts interpreted "accident" to include continu-
ous or repeated exposure which increased insurers' liability. See Hamel, supra
note 105, at 1102.
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leaving insurers without a reliable means of calculating their expo-
sure to liability."
4
Faced with this uncertainty and insureds' demands for broader
coverage," 5 the insurance industry abandoned accident-based poli-
cies and adopted "occurrence-based" policies in 1966.116 The stan-
dard occurrence-based policy defined occurrence to mean ."an acci-
dent, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured."11 7 Significantly, this definition was not intended to cover
pollution that was either expected or intentional."l 8 Therefore, al-
though occurrence-based coverage included gradual pollution, it
did not cover gradual pollution that was caused by "'natural and ob-
vious consequence[s] [of] the [insured's] regular operation of a
business.""' 9
Again, the courts formulated their own interpretations of the
scope of occurrence-based policies. 120 This resulted in unpredictable
judicial determinations and an increase in liability exposure to in-
surers.12' In response to the increase in litigation and liability expo-
114. See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1246.
115. See Hamel, supra note 105, at 1102. During the 1960s, courts began to embrace
expansive tort theories encompassing claims arising from injuries that involved
long latency periods. See id. Insureds began to demand coverage for these
claims, and foreign insurers such as Lloyd's of London responded. See id.
Thus, foreign competition was a major impetus for the occurrence-based CGL
policy. See id.
116. See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1246; Hamel, supra note 105, at 1102.
117. Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1246-47 (quoting Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected
or Intended Personal Injury Property Damage Under the Occurrence Definition of the
Standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 19 FORUM 513, 513 (1984)).
118. See id. at 1247; cf. 7A APPLEMAN, supra note 7, § 4523, at 207 ("If damages were
expected or intended, then an occurrence takes place and no coverage ex-
ists.").
119. Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1248 (quoting Jerry E. Cardwell, Note, Insurance
and Its Role in the Struggle Between Protecting Pollution Victims and the Producers of
Pollution, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 922 (1982)) (alterations in original); see also
Hamel, supra note 105, at 1103 (detailing an insurance industry memorandum
that indicated the occurrence-based CGL policy was intended to cover gradual
damages).
120. See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1248-50 (discussing the courts approaches to
construing the word "accident" in occurrence-based policies; indicating that
many courts based their interpretations on the foreseeability of the damage).
121. See id. at 1251. See generally Hamel, supra note 105, at 1103 (explaining that in
most states, insurers were required to submit policy changes, such as the
newly adopted pollution exclusion clause, to the state's insurance commis-
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sure regarding environmental coverage, insurers changed their poli-
cies a third time, opting for a pollution exclusion clause.
122
The original pollution exclusion clause, the standard pollution
exclusion clause, incorporated in the 1973 CGL policy provided:
This [p]olicy [s]hall [n]ot [a]pply: [to] bodily injury or
property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, re-
lease or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other ir-
ritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water....l13
The standard pollution exclusion clause contained one major ex-
ception-the clause did not apply to "sudden and accidental"
pollution.
24
Since the creation of the standard pollution exclusion clause,
there has been considerable litigation over its scope. 25 Courts
broadly construed the sudden and accidental exception to encom-
pass losses caused by "intentional, ongoing business operations,"
which enhanced insurers exposure for losses associated with envi-
ronmental pollution. 26 This lead one commentator to characterize
sioner for approval).
122. See Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 513-15, 667 A.2d 617, 622 (1995)
(citing Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 102 Md. App. 45, 51, 648 A.2d
1047 (1994)); TOD I. ZUCKERMAN & MARK C. RASKOFF, ENVIRONMENTAL INSUR-
ANCE LITIGATION § 5.02 (1998).
123. ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LAILITY INSURANCE § 10A.04[2] (1997) (dis-
cussing the pollution exclusion clause's development and evolution from the
late 1960s until its present form, the "absolute pollution exclusion."); see also
Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 102 Md. App. 45, 52, 648 A.2d 1047, 1050
(1994); 1973 Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, reprinted in
TOD I. ZUCKERMAN & MARK C. RASKOFF, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE LITIGATION
PRACTCE FORMS FORM VI-2, at VI-23 (1998).
124. See 7A APPLEMAN, supra note 7, § 4524.10 (Lexis L. Pub. Supp. 1998); LONG,
supra note 123, 10A.04[2]. See generally ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS &
DISPUTES §§ 11.11-.12 (1995) (discussing the limitations and evolution of the
pollution exclusion clause to its current language).
125. One federal judge has stated that "[t]he cases swim the reporters like fish in a
lake." Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1541, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1987). The judge continued to state that the
defendant, an insurer, "would have this Court pull up its line with a trout on
the hook, and argue that the lake is full of trout only, when in fact the water
is full of bass, salmon and sunfish too." Id. at 1549-50 (explaining that the ap-
plication of pollution exclusion clauses depend on the facts of each case).
126. Hamel, supra note 105, at 1253-56 (discussing interpretational problems associ-
ated with the terms "sudden" and "accidental" in the 1973 Comprehensive
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the standard pollution exclusion clause as "ill-fated" because courts
often sided with the insureds in actions seeking to negate it."7 The
rationale for these decisions focuses on the ambiguous nature of
the pollution clause, coupled with the principle that ambiguous
contracts are to be construed against the drafter of the contract. 2 8
In 1986, the insurance industry responded by amending the
standard insurance policy to include a broader pollution exclusion
clause. 29 This "absolute" pollution exclusion clause excluded cover-
age for: "'bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising out of the ac-
tual, alleged or threatened discharge .. .or escape of pollutants."
130
The absolute pollution exclusion clause defined the term pollution
as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, in-
cluding smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and
waste. "131
The major change from the standard pollution exclusion clause
to the absolute was that the absolute pollution exclusion clause
dropped the sudden and accidental exception. 132 Thus, the latest
version of the pollution exclusion clause is broader than any of the
preceding clauses and serves as an absolute bar against coverage.
33
The judicial uncertainty and disregard of the insurers intent
that plagued the standard pollution exclusion clause forced many
insurers to abandon the business of covering pollution related
losses, opting for absolute exclusion. 34 One commentator has gone
so far as to suggest that the courts unfaithful application of the pol-
General Liability policy).
127. See Garrett L. Joest, III, Will Insurance Companies Clean the Augean Stables? -
Insurance Coverage for the Landfill Operator, 50 Ins. Couns. J. 258, 260 (1983)
("Where there is a possibility that another circumstance other than pollution
may have caused the harm, the exclusion will not apply.").
128. See supra notes 23, 34, 40, 81, 84, infra notes 145-54, 157, 192, 237 and accom-
panying text. Other courts base their decision to negate the pollution exclu-
sion clause on tort principles. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, 20 (5th ed. 1984) ("A recognized need for
compensation is .. .a powerful factor influencing tort law. Even though, like
other factors, it is not alone decisive, it nevertheless lends weight ... to an ar-
gument for liability that is supported also by an array of other factors.").
129. See 7A APPLEmAN, supra note 7, § 4525 (Lexis L. Pub. Supp. 1998).
130. 1986 Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, reprinted in ZUcKERMAN
& RASKOFF, supra note 123, Form VI-1, at VI-9 (1998).
131. Id. In addition, the clause defines the term waste to include "materials to be
recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed." Id.
132. See id. Form VI-1, at VI-9 & Form VI-2, at VI-23.
133. See 7A APPLEMAN, supra note 7, § 4525 (Lexis L. Pub. Supp. 1998).
134. See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1278.
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lution exclusion clause has directly caused a slow down in the al-
ready sluggish environmental cleanup effort. 35 Insurers are simply
unable to bear the costs of cleaning up the environment. 36 As a re-
sult, insurers have refused to provide any coverage and in turn, the
environmental cleanup effort has slowed even further.
1 37
Courts tend to uphold and enforce pollution exclusion clauses
based on two public policy rationales. First, these clauses allow for
limitations on coverage and ensure that insurance companies "can
continue to serve their function of providing economic stability to
their insureds.' ' 38 Second, the clauses are needed to guard against
the intentional pollution that may occur if insureds know that the
insurer will defend them in any action stemming from pollution. 3
9
Litigation concerning the current pollution exclusion clause focuses
less on the clause's general validity or whether the facts supporting




138. Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Com-
prehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 610, 628
(1990) (discussing CGLs in the wake of increasingly stringent environmental
laws, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)). "The public and regulatory objective of general liability insurance is
to transfer the risk of certain types of business-related losses that could
threaten an insureds' viability.... [P]ublic policy [should forbid] the transfer
of liability for . . . intentional losses." Id.
139. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 875
(N.J. 1993). "[Ihf an insured knows that liability incurred by all manner of
negligent or careless spills and releases is covered by his liability policy, he is
tempted to diminish his precautions and relax his vigilance." Waste Manage-
ment of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 381 (N.C. 1986).
140. Cf Alcolac Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1546, 1549 (D. Md.
1989) ("This pollution exclusion is just what it purports to be-absolute-and
the Court perceives no reason why [the insurer] should be denied the benefit
of its bargain with [the insured], as reflected in the insurance contract."); Sul-
lins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 509-11, 667 A.2d 617, 620-21 (1995) (fo-
cusing on whether lead paint was a pollutant under the absolute pollution ex-
clusion clause); Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 102 Md. App. 45, 50-55,
648 A.2d 1047, 1050-51 (1995) (focusing on whether carbon monoxide gas was
a pollutant under the policy exclusion clause). The absolute pollution exclu-
sion clause is a bar against coverage. Thus, in order to obtain coverage an in-
sured must prove that the claim does not involve pollution, and therefore falls
outside of the exclusion. See generally 7A APPLEMAN, supra note 7, § 4525, at
225-28 (Lexis L. Pub. Supp. 1998).
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stead, the pivotal issue current courts often face revolves around de-
fining pollutants because once something is deemed a pollutant,
coverage is barred by the absolute pollution exclusion clause.
141
C. The Pollution Exclusion Outside of Maryland
1. Federal Courts
Considerable debate surrounds the legally operative meaning of
the word "pollutant.' 1 42 For instance, in Regent Insurance Co. v.
Holmes,143 the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
held that carpet dye, used by a commercial carpet dyeing company
that burned a child, was not a pollutant. 144 The court concluded
that the insurance contract was ambiguous because of its definition
of pollutant. 145 The court looked to the policy which defined pollu-
tants to be " 'solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritants or contami-
nants.' ",146 However, the policy did not further define irritants or
contaminants. Therefore, the definition of pollutants was ambigu-
ous and the court resorted to extrinsic evidence to resolve the
ambiguity.
147
The court relied on standard dictionary definitions of the
words contaminant and irritant.148 According to the dictionary, an
irritant was "something that irritates or excites;" a contaminant was
141. It appears as though the main problem with which many courts have grappled
stems from the difficulty of defining exactly what is a "pollutant." See generally
Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1990)
(applying New Hampshire law and holding that extreme amounts of light and
noise were not considered to be pollutants); New Castle County v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 778 F. Supp. 812 (D. Del. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 1267
(1992) (holding that a substance is not a pollutant unless it is toxic in nature
and recognized as toxic by statute); Action Auto Stores, Inc. v. United Capitol
Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 428 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (holding that gasoline in a stor-
age tank was not a pollutant); West Bend Ins. Co. v. Iowa Iron Works, Inc.,
503 N.W.2d 596 (Iowa 1993) (holding that a pollution exclusion clause that
excluded waste did not apply to garbage).
142. See Regent Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 835 F. Supp. 579, 581-82 (D. Kan. 1993).
143. Id. at 579.
144. See id. at 582.
145. See id. at 581. The court held that because of the ambiguity, the policy must
be interpreted in the light most favorable to the insured. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 581-82.




"something that contaminates."' 49 The Regent court held that the
policy's definition of pollutant was too broad because many sub-
stances could irritate or contaminate; thus, it would be inconceiv-
able to consider, and exclude, all such substances as pollutants.150
Moreover, the extrinsic evidence was insufficient to resolve the
ambiguity of the term pollutant.'51 Consequently, the court con-
strued the term pollutant in a light most favorable to the insured.
52
In so doing, the court refused to classify the dye as a pollutant be-
cause it was not "harmful or toxic to persons or the environment"
generally.'53 The court concluded that the carpet dye was not a pol-
lutant that the insurance policy excluded from coverage.
154
Once a court finds that the pollution exclusion clause is ambig-
uous, many jurisdictions hold that such ambiguity should be inter-
preted in favor of the insured. 55 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit followed this principle in Hydro Systems,
Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co.156 In Hydro Systems, the court rea-
soned that standard insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion.'57
149. Id.
150. See id. at 582; see also Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins.
Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992).
151. See Regent, 835 F. Supp. at 582.
152. See id. at 581-82.
153. Id. at 582 & n.5. The court stated that, under these facts, because this was a
release that caused injury to a person, rather than to the environment, the
carpet dye could not be considered a pollutant. The court also made a dis-
tinction between substances that are harmful or toxic to persons and the envi-
ronment in general from substances that are harmful or toxic if not used cor-
rectly. See id.
154. See id.
155. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sponholz, 866 F.2d 1162, 1163 (9th Cir.
1989) (citing Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1982)).
156. 929 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1991). Hydro Systems involved a manufacturer of fi-
berglass bathtubs being sued by nearby residents who sought injunctive relief,
alleging that the manufacturer's emissions were causing them bodily injury. See
id. at 473. The manufacturer sought coverage for costs associated with comply-
ing with a city order that required it to install an air pollution control system
to neutralize odors emanating from its plant. See id.
157. See id. at 474 (citing Globe Indem. Co. v. State, 118 Cal. Rptr. 75, 78 (1974));
see also W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law
Making Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529, 540 (1971) (explaining that insurance con-
tracts are different from most other contracts because the purchaser of the
policy often does not view the policy until he pays for it). See generally supra
notes 22, 24 (discussing contracts of adhesion and the doctrine of contra profer-
entem). Contra proferentem is a canon of contract construction that requires a
court to construe ambiguous contract provisions "most strongly against the
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The court also held that contracts of adhesion, when ambiguous,
should be construed against the drafter.58 Thus, it logically followed
that the ambiguous standard insurance contract at issue should be
construed against the insurer because the insurer drafted the
contract. 159
2. State Holdings from Other Jurisdictions
In West American Insurance Co. v. Tufco Flooring East, Inc.,160 a
flooring installer resurfaced the floor of a chicken plant with an al-
leged pollutant. 161 Shortly thereafter, the chickens held in a storage
unit close to the newly resurfaced area tested positive for styrene,
and were unfit for human consumption. 162 Ruling that the flooring
material, styrene monomer resin, was not a pollutant such as would
fall under the relevant pollution exclusion clause, the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals relied on the principle that when a "reasona-
ble person in the position of the insured" expects coverage, the pol-
icy should be interpreted to provide for coverage. 163 The court
found that the flooring installer could have reasonably expected
coverage for such an incident, and therefore held that the insurer
was obligated to defend.164
In A-1 Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden,165 an action
was brought against an insurance company by a bridge painter who
caused damage to vehicles by negligently spray painting a bridge.
66
The Court of Appeals of Oregon held that there was a material is-
sue of fact as to whether paint fell under the provisions of the pol-
person who selected the language." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed.
1990) (citing United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 216 (1970).
158. See Hydro Systems, 929 F.2d at 474 (citing Sponholz, 866 F.2d at 1163); see also Pis-
ciotta, 640 P.2d at 768.
159. See Hydro Systems, 929 F.2d at 474 (citing Sponholz, 866 F.2d at 1163); see also Pis-
ciotta, 640 P.2d at 768.
160. 409 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
161. See id. at 693.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 697 (citing Grant v. Emmco Ins. Co., 243 S.E.2d 894, 897 (N.C. 1978)
("If this Court accepted West American's interpretation of the CGL policy, we
would be allowing an insurance policy to accept premiums . . .and then to
hide behind ambiguities in the policy .... )).
164. See id. (emphasizing that Tufco purchased the policy in order to cover itself in
the event of just these types of liabilities).




icy's pollution exclusion clause. 167 The policy specifically excluded,
among other things, smoke, soot, toxic chemicals, waste materials,
"or other irritants, contaminants, or pollutants." 168 The court ap-
plied the doctrine of ejusdem generis,169 and found that paint could
be generally thought of as neither an irritant nor a contaminant, as
it does not fairly fall into the category of specifically excluded sub-
stances enumerated before the "or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants" language. 170 The court also rejected the insurer's argu-
ment that paint was a "liquid irritant," reasoning that this proposed
interpretation would be too broad. 7' Similarly, while the paint may
have fallen within the policy's definition of a pollutant, due to its
chemical composition, a reasonable person in the position of the
insured would not believe that paint was a substance referred to or
covered by the pollution exclusion clause; thus, a reasonable person
could expect to be insured under those circumstances.
17 2
In Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co.," 3 a real estate developer allegedly caused property damage
to the plaintiffs by negligently allowing dirt and sand to wash over
their land. 74 Alabama's highest court addressed whether the sand
that washed from the developer's construction site was an "inten-
tional, expected and nonaccidental discharge of pollutants," and
thereby exempted from coverage by the pollution exclusion
clause.' 75 The insured argued that the doctrine of ejusdem generis
should be applied-even if the terms "contaminants" and "irri-
tants" were given their broadest meaning, reasonable people could
167. See id. at 1378.
168. Id.
169. "[T]he 'ejusdem generis rule' is, that where general words follow an enumera-
tion of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are . . .to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned." BLACK'S LAw DIG
TIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990).
170. A-] Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co., 632 P.2d at 1379 (citing McGrath v. Elec-
trical Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 231 (Or. 1961); Raybur v. Crawford, 211 P.2d 483
(Or. 1949)).
171. See id. The court stated that over-emphasis of the "liquid" element of the
clause could lead to an argument that even pure water could be excluded
from the policy. See id.
172. See id.
173. 347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977).
174. See id. at 96-97.
175. Id. at 97. The court was also faced with the issue of whether the developer's
actions were done with the specific intent to cause harm to the plaintiffs. See
1998]
Baltimore Law Review
not be expected to conclude that sand and dirt fell within the cate-
gory of "smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids" or other toxic
substances.176
Ruling in favor of the insured, the court held that the pollu-
tion exclusion clause did not apply to the developer's activities.
17
The court noted that the clause applied only in instances involving
"industrial pollution and contamination.' '7 8 Therefore, the insurer
had a duty to indemnify the real estate developer in the underlying
suit.179
Other courts have similarly adopted this interpretation. 80 In
Thompson v. Temple,'5 ' a Louisiana appellate court held that a land-
lord's insurer could be liable for a tenant's injuries resulting from
carbon monoxide poisoning.8 2  The court reasoned that
"[p]ollution exclusion clauses are intended to exclude coverage for
active industrial polluters, when businesses knowingly emitted pollu-
tants over extended periods of time.' 183 These cases and others indi-
cate a movement by courts to limit the circumstances when they will
enforce pollution exclusion clauses.'
176. Id. at 98. The insured countered that it could not be expected to list every
substance in the clause. See id.
177. See id. at 100.
178. Id. at 99.
179. See id. at 96, 100.
180. See American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553
(E.D. Mich. 1984); Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 456 N.YS.2d 504,
505-06 (N.Y App. Div. 1982); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union,
Inc., 664 P.2d 1262, 1266 (Wash. App. 1983).
181. 580 So. 2d 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
182. See id. at 1135. But see Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 102 Md. App. 45,
50, 648 A.2d 1047, 1049 (1994) (holding that an exception to the pollution ex-
clusion clause that provided the insured landlord with coverage for damage
resulting from fumes from a hostile fire did not apply to a release of carbon
monoxide or fire resulting from such a release).
183. Thompson, 580 So. 2d at 1134 (emphasis added).
184. See Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037,
1043 (7th Cir. 1992).
To take but two simple examples, reading the clause broadly would
bar coverage for bodily injuries suffered by one who slips and falls on
the spilled contents of a bottle of Drano, and for bodily injury
caused by an allergic reaction to chlorine in a public pool. Although
Drano and chlorine are both irritants and contaminants that cause,
under certain conditions, bodily injury or property damage, one
would not ordinarily characterize these events as pollution.
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3. The Sudden and Accidental Exception to the Standard Pollu-
tion Exclusion Clause
Even though many modem insurance policies use the absolute
pollution exclusion clause, litigation involving the standard pollu-
tion exclusion clause is still prevalent. The principle distinction be-
tween the absolute pollution exclusion clause and the standard
pollution exclusion clause is that the standard pollution exclusion
clause contains one explicit exception 85 The exception provides
that the pollution exclusion clause will not apply if a "discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental."' 86 While an
insured may generally expect to be covered for sudden and acciden-
tal pollution incidents, an insurer's obligation to defend arises only
if the pollution is unforeseeable and unintended.
18 7
Still, courts have held that long-term pollution, even if acciden-
tal, is within the language of the pollution exclusion clause. 188
Courts are divided on whether an intentional discharge could be
sudden and accidental. 189 In some cases, courts have found that in-
tentional discharge falls within the scope of the pollution exclusion
clause, thereby relieving the insurer of any obligation to defend the
insured. 90 For example, in Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Sunnes,'9'
the Oregon Court of Appeals found that the insured's intentional
185. See 7A APPLEMAN, supra note 7, §§ 4524-4524.10, at 210-24 (Lexis L. Pub. Supp.
1998).
186. LONG, supra note 123, § 10A.04[2]; see Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1241-46.
187. See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 1243-44. See generally LONG, supra note 123, §
10A.04[2].
188. See generally Ray Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 768-69 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that gradual pollution resulting from regularly crushing bar-
rels that contained contaminants was not sudden); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg., 693 F. Supp. 617, 622 (M.D. Tenn. 1988)
(holding that an "event" that occurs over a period of six years is not sudden);
Barment of Ind., Inc. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201, 202-03 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that gas emissions were not sudden and accidental be-
cause they were predictable and foreseeable); City of Milwaukee v. Allied
Smelting Corp., 344 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Wis. 1983) (holding that an insurer
could not be held liable for damage to a city sewer system caused by the dis-
charge of acid).
189. See Hamel, supra note 105, at 1099.
190. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212, 214 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the in-
sured's release of pollutants over a long period of time was not sudden and
accidental).
191. Id. at 212.
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discharge over many years precluded coverage by the insurer.'92 The
court held that the exclusion clause in question clearly negated the
insurer's duty to defend because the insured was an "active
polluter." 193
Notably, the sudden and accidental exception has been con-
strued by courts to include a temporal element-the word "sud-
den" means that the pollution cannot occur over a long period of
time. 194 In Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chemical Co., 195 the United
States District Court for the District of Utah held that routine dis-
charges which occurred over a long period of time were not sudden
and accidental. 96 The issue in Anaconda was whether an insurer had
a duty to defend and indemnify an insured party who consented to
environmental clean-up. 197 In discussing whether the insured party's
insurer must pay for damages assessed against the insured, the
court, emphasizing the accidental element of the exception, ruled
that the sudden and accidental exception did not apply to intended
pollution discharges. 198
When construing insurance contracts, Utah courts follow the
general rule that drafters intend all of the language used in a con-
tract to have a purpose. 99 Under this rule, courts will not interpret
words in such a way as to render other language superfluous.2°° The
court reasoned that the word "sudden" "has an ordinary meaning
with a temporal element that makes it synonymous with 'abruptly'
or 'quickly."' 20 1 Furthermore, "accidental" was defined as meaning
"not expected or intended by the insured." 20 2 Therefore, construing
"sudden" to have a temporal element was necessary in order to
192. See id. at 214. For a case involving an egregious polluter's attempts to establish
ambiguity in a pollution exclusion clause, see Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-
Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1321 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
193. Transamerica Ins. Co., 711 P.2d at 214.
194. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. at 1317 (discussing the fact that an event that
is "sudden," by its customary definition, cannot occur over a period of years).
195. 773 F. Supp. 1498 (D. Utah 1991).
196. See id. at 1508.
197. See id. at 1500.
198. See id. at 1505-06. For an in-depth analysis of the sudden and accidental excep-
tion and long-term pollution, see Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of
Am., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993).
199. See Anaconda, 773 F. Supp. at 1504.
200. See id. at 1504.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1505.
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avoid defining it as meaning "unexpected. ' 20 3 Without a temporal
element, the term "sudden" would be construed as synonymous
with "accident," therefore violating Utah contract law by effectively
rendering "accidental" meaningless as surplusage.
2°4
D. The Pollution Exclusion Clause in Maryland
Recently, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed
the effect of the pollution exclusion clause in Bentz v. Mutual Fire,
Marine & Inland Insurance Co.20 5 In Bentz, the plaintiffs alleged that
an exterminator negligently applied toxic pesticides to interior sur-
faces and exterior portions of the plaintiffs' home.2°6 The plaintiffs,
homeowners in West Virginia, sued the exterminator's insurer seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that the insurer had a duty to defend
and indemnify the exterminator.207 The court, finding that the neg-
ligent acts of the exterminator were sudden and accidental, 20 8 ruled
that the defendant's acts fell within the sudden and accidental ex-
ception to the pollution exclusion clause.20 9 Therefore, the plain-
tiffs' claim against the exterminator was not excluded by the pollu-
tion exclusion clause, and thus, the insurer had a duty to defend
and indemnify the exterminator.
210
A few years later, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland an-
alyzed another pollution exclusion clause in Bernhardt v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co.2 '1 In Bernhardt, a landlord's heating system mal-
functioned, causing tenants in his apartment building to suffer car-
bon monoxide poisoning. 2 2 The insurance company denied the
203. See id. at 1506.
204. See id.
205. 83 Md. App. 524, 575 A.2d 795 (1990).
206. See id. at 527, 575 A.2d at 796. The plaintiffs also contended that the spraying
violated federal law as well as West Virginia and Maryland law. See id.
207. See id. at 528, 575 A.2d at 797. The exterminator "assigned to Plaintiffs all of
his rights, interests, and causes of action to proceed against [his insurer] to
obtain a judicial Declaration of [its] duties and liabilities." Id. (alterations in
original).
208. See id. at 538, 575 A.2d at 803 (explaining that the exterminator's negligence
was "accidental in that it was unintended" and "sudden in that the inappro-
priate contact, from which the harm arose, was more or less instantaneous").
209. See id. The pollution exclusion clause did not apply if " 'such discharge, disper-
sal, release or escape' [was] sudden and accidental." Id. at 530, 575 A.2d at
798.
210. See id. at 540, 575 A.2d at 803.
211. 102 Md. App. 45, 648 A.2d 1047 (1994).
212. See id. at 47, 648 A.2d at 1047-48. The heater malfunctioned because debris
fell from an old chimney and blocked the boiler's air passageway. See id. at 47,
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landlord coverage, relying on the policy's pollution exclusion
clause.21 3 The landlord argued that the pollution exclusion clause
only pertained to industrial pollution.21 4 The court rejected this ar-
gument because there was no language in the pollution exclusion
clause that limited the exclusion to industrial pollution. 21 5 Addition-
ally, the court opined that the landlord's argument would be diffi-
cult to apply because there is no exact definition of "industrial pol-
lution. ' 21 6 Finally, the court explained that it would be difficult to
understand why the insurance industry would include a limitation
or coverage exclusion of this type in a homeowner's policy if the ex-
clusion applied only to industrial pollution. 21 7 Thus, the court de-
clined to limit the pollution exclusion clause in the homeowner's
policy to industrial waste.
21 8
In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc.,219 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the sudden and accidental
exception to the pollution exclusion clause in the context of a long-
term polluter.220 The pollution exclusion clause in question stated
that the insurer would not provide coverage for bodily injury or
property damage stemming from pollution unless the pollution was
sudden and accidental.2 1' The case involved the sale of a paint fac-
tory to Sherwin-Williams, and the subsequent discovery that the site
had contaminated groundwater and soil. 222 The court held that
Sherwin-Williams's complaint sufficiently alleged continuous pollut-
648 A.2d at 1048.
213. See id. at 48, 648 A.2d at 1048.
214. See id. at 50, 648 A.2d at 1049. The landlord also argued that the exception to
the pollution exclusion clause provided coverage for damages resulting from a
hostile fire and that this incident fell within the exception. See id.
215. See id. at 55, 648 A.2d at 1051.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 57, 648 A.2d at 1052.
219. 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
220. See id. at 586, 659 A.2d at 1308; see also Douglas I. Wood, Note, Limited Renvoi
Exception Will Be Utilized When Lex Loci Contractus Indicates That Foreign Juris-
dictions Would Apply Maryland Law to Substantive Issue, 26 U. BALT. L. REv. 247
(1996) (discussing the pollution exclusion issue as well as the doctrine of lex
loci contractus in the context of the American Motorists court's decision).
221. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 564-65, 659 A.2d at 1297.
222. See id. at 563-64, 659 A.2d at 1296-97. Sherwin-Williams Company purchased
the site from ARTRA and brought suit against ARTRA and other past owners
after the Maryland Department of the Environment ordered Sherwin-Williams
to "investigate and remedy hazardous waste contamination in the soil and
groundwater at the . .. [s]ite." Id. at 564, 659 A.2d at 1297.
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ing activity by the insured, and therefore avoided potential coverage
under the "sudden and accidental" language of the pollution exclu-
sion clause. 223 The allegations made by Sherwin-Williams concerning
gradual pollution could not "be isolated to provide occurrences
which are sudden. '224 As a result, there was no basis for finding the
insurer liable to indemnify or defend the insured.
22
E. Lead Paint and the Pollution Exclusion Clause
When faced with a pollution exclusion clause in a lead paint
case, most courts have held that lead paint falls outside of the ex-
clusion; thus, the insurer must defend the insured.226 For example,
in Generali-U.S. Branch v. Caribe Realty Corp.,22 a New York trial court
held that the pollution exclusion clause did not apply in a case in-
volving a child who ingested lead paint.228 The court reasoned that
in order for an insurer to negate coverage for lead paint injuries,
the insurer should include the term "lead, paint, or lead based
paint" in the policy's definition of pollutant.229 The definition of
pollutant in the policy at issue in Generali failed to include these
specific terms, therefore the court held that the insurer failed to
meet its burden of proving that the policy did not cover lead paint
exposure.
20
223. See id. at 593, 659 A.2d at 1311.
224. Id. at 589, 659 A.2d at 1309 (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. See id. at 594, 659 A.2d at 1311-12.
226. See Lefrak Org., Inc. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 949, 956 (S.D.N.Y
1996); Weaver v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 674 A.2d 975, 978 (N.H. 1996) (hold-
ing that lead paint chips were not pollution where the chips had been trans-
ported by an industrial worker and ingested by a child, subsequently causing
lead paint poisoning in the child). But see United States Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Bourbeau, 49 F.3d 786, 789 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that paint chips which
had negligently fallen onto the soil were pollution); Shalmar Contractors, Inc.
v. American States Ins. Co., 975 F. Supp. 1450, 1457 (M.D. Ala. 1997). For
cases disallowing the application of the pollution exclusion clause in instances
of lead paint poisoning, see NL Indus., Inc. v. Committee Union Ins. Co., 926
F. Supp. 446 (D.N.J. 1996), Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. McFadden, 595 N.E.2d 762
(Mass. 1992), GA Ins. Co. v. Naimerg Realty Assoc., Inc., 650 N.YS.2d 246
(N.Y Sup. Ct. 1996), General Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Idbar Realty Corp.,
622 N.YS.2d 417 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1994), Generali-U.S. Branch v. Caribe Realty
Corp., 612 N.YS.2d 296 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1994), and Vance v. Sukup, 558 N.W.2d
683 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
227. 612 N.YS.2d 296 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1994).
228. See id. at 299.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 298.
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In General Accident Insurance Co. of America v. Idbar Realty,231 a
New York trial court followed a rationale similar to that employed
by the Generali court.2 2 The case involved a lead paint poisoning
claim brought on behalf of a child who ingested lead paint chips
which were peeling off the apartment's walls.233 The court held that
an insurer "cannot negate coverage unless the exclusion is subject
to no other reasonable interpretation." 234 However, the pollution ex-
clusion clause at issue was in fact subject to a different interpreta-
tion-the pollution exclusion clause only applied "to claims for in-
juries based upon industrial environmental pollution. ' 235 In light of
evidence that the plaintiff suffered injuries during the period of
coverage, 236 and the absence of an express unambiguous exclusion,
the court concluded that the insurer had a duty to defend. 237
However, in Oates v. State,238 another New York trial court
reached the opposite result. The Oates court held that lead paint
was a chemical that could irritate, and therefore fell "within the
general tenor of the specifically listed pollutants."239 The court rea-
soned that it would be impossible for an insurer to list every sub-
stance that they intended to fall within the pollution exclusion
clause 240
In Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. McFadden,241 Massachusetts's
highest court ruled in favor of the insured, rejecting the argument
that the pollution exclusion clause applied to lead paint poison-
ing.242 The insurer sought a declaratory judgment relieving itself of
the duty to defend a landlord in an action arising from lead paint
231. 622 N.YS.2d 417 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1994).
232. See id. at 418-20.
233. See id. at 418.
234. Id. at 419.
235. Id. "[T]he plaintiff cannot meet its burden as to the applicability of the exclu-
sion and is obligated to indemnify its insureds upon the trial of the underly-
ing action." Id. at 419-20.
236. See id. at 418.
237. See id. For an exclusion to be unambiguous, it must be "subject to no other
reasonable interpretation." Id. at 419.
238. 597 N.YS.2d 550 (N.Y Ct. Cl. 1993).
239. Id. at 554. The insurance policy defined pollutants as "any solid, liquid, gase-
ous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste." Id. at 551.
240. See id. at 554.
241. 595 N.E.2d 762 (Mass. 1992).
242. See id. at 764.
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poisoning involving the tenant's two children. 243 In ruling that the
insurer had a duty to defend the landlord in an action brought by a
tenant exposed to lead paint, the court stated that there was no lan-
guage in the exclusion provision which indicated that the policy was
drafted with the intent of limiting liability for lead paint poison-
ing.2" Indeed, the definition of "pollutant" in the policy did not in-
dicate that leaded materials fell within its scope.245 The court rea-
soned that an insured might reasonably expect lead-related injuries
to be covered, and therefore concluded that the exclusion clause
applied only in situations arising from industrial pollution.
246
In United States Liability Insurance Co. v. Bourbeau,247 the court
distinguished the case before it from the McFadden case and ruled
that discharged lead paint was a pollutant within the standard pollu-
tion exclusion clause.248 Bourbeau, a painting contractor, removed
old paint from a building, and in the process contaminated the sur-
rounding soil.2 49 The court distinguished the facts of this case from
McFadden by noting that McFadden was a personal injury case involv-
ing the presence of lead paint inside a house, while Bourbeau was an
environmental pollution case.
250
Specifically, the Bourbeau case involved the discharge of lead
paint chips onto land, while in McFadden the lead paint remained
inside a house and was not discharged into the soil.25 I The Bourbeau
court explained that the discharge of a harmful substance into the
environment was a classic example of pollution whereas "[a]n ob-
jectively reasonable person simply would not ascribe the word 'pol-
lution' to the presence of lead paint in[side] a house." 252 Therefore,
the Bourbeau court concluded that the insured painting contractor
could not have reasonably expected to be covered for an injury that
arose from lead paint contamination of land surrounding the area
he worked on.
253
243. See id. at 763. The landlords in this case were Dime Real Estate Services-
Massachusetts, Inc., and Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB. See id.
244. See id. at 764.
245. See id.
246. See id.





252. Id. at 789.
253. See id. But see A-i Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden Co., 632 P.2d
1377, 1379 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that when property damage resulted
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The rationale of the Oates court was followed in St. Leger v.
American Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.254 In St. Leger, the landlord's
insurer denied the landlord a defense in a lead paint case brought
by a tenant2 5 In reaching its holding, the court first looked to the
policy which defined pollutant as an irritant or contaminant2 6 Rely-
ing on a previous case, the court concluded that the term "pollu-
tant" unambiguously included lead paint within its definition. 257
Despite determining that the term pollutant unambiguously in-
cluded lead paint, the court looked to several federal statutes that
dealt with lead paint and pollution.2 5 8 The federal statutes used lan-
guage indicating that lead paint was commonly referred to as an ir-
ritant and a pollutant.259 Accordingly, the court found that lead
paint was a pollutant within the meaning of the pollution exclusion
clause. 260 Therefore, the court held that the insurer did not have a
duty to defend.
261
Until Sullins, Maryland's high court had never addressed
whether injuries from lead paint exposure fall within the purview of
an absolute pollution exclusion clause. In Chantel Associates v. Mount
Vernon Fire Insurance Co.,262 the court of appeals held that an insurer
had a duty to defend a landlord in a lead paint case.263 The issue
before the court in Chantel, however, was the effective date of cover-
age and when an insurer's duty to defend was triggered, rather than
the applicability of the pollution exclusion clause. 264 The Chantel
court held that the insurer has a duty to defend when there are
facts alleged in the complaint that allude to the potentiality for
from a painter's negligent painting, the paint was not considered a pollutant).
254. 870 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
255. See id. at 642.
256. See id. at 643.
257. See id. The court explained that "[t]he meaning here is clear. '[[L]]ead is a
chemical that irritates and contaminates.' This is widely understood." Id.
(quoting Kaytes v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., No. 93-1573 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6,
1994) (slip opinion)) (alteration in original).
258. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.2, 50.12 (defining lead as a pollutant in the con-
text of the ambient air quality standards provided by the Clean Air Act)).
259. See id. (citing Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42
U.S.C. § 4851(b) (15) and Clean Air Act, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.2, 50.12).
260. See id.
261. See id. at 644.
262. 338 Md. 131, 656 A.2d 779 (1995).
263. See id. at 146, 656 A.2d at 786.
264. See id.; see also Ogburn, supra note 44 (discussing how insurance coverage is





The Chantel case involved four insurers. 66 Three of the four in-
surers issued general liability insurance policies to Chantel; the
fourth insurer issued a renewable umbrella policy for the period
covered by the general liability policies. 267 The trial judge granted
summary judgment in favor of one of the insurers, Scottsdale Insur-
ance Company, because it had a clause in its policy specifically ex-
cluding claims for damages arising from lead paint injuries.
2 68
Mount Vernon's policy provided for coverage for bodily injuries aris-
ing from an occurrence; however, the policy contained neither a
lead paint exclusion clause nor a pollution exclusion clause.2 69 The
court concluded that injuries resulting from lead paint poisoning
were bodily injuries arising from an occurrence,270 and therefore
Mount Vernon owed a duty to defend the landlord. 271 Thus, Chantel
set the stage for the Sullins court's decision.
III. THE SULLINS CASE
In Sullins v. Allstate Insurance Co.,272 a tenant living in rental
property owned by the Sullinses sued them, alleging that her child
suffered injuries as a result of ingesting lead paint.273 Allstate filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Ma-
ryland arguing that the pollution exclusion clause excused Allstate's
duty to provide a defense or to indemnify the Sullinses.
274
265. See Chantel, 338 Md. at 142, 656 A.2d at 784.
266. See id. at 136, 656 A.2d at 781-82. Empire Indemnity Insurance Company pro-
vided Chantel with general liability coverage from April 1, 1984 through April
1, 1985. See id. Chantel's general liability insurance policy with Mount Vernon
Fire Insurance Company ran from April 1, 1985 through March 12, 1986. See
id. at 136, 656 A.2d at 781. Scottsdale Insurance Company provided general li-
ability coverage from March 12, 1986 through March 12, 1988, in two consecu-
tive policies. See id. Allstate Insurance Company provided umbrella coverage,
on an annual basis, for the period from February 10, 1983 through February
10, 1993. See id.
267. See id. at 136, 656 A.2d at 781-82.
268. See id. at 139, 656 A.2d at 783. The court also found that Chantel was aware of
the exclusion in the policy. See id.
269. See id. at 142-43, 656 A.2d at 785.
270. See id. at 138, 656 A.2d at 782-83. "[T]here was a potentiality that the lead-
related injuries occurred during Mount Vernon's policy period." Id. at 146,
656 A.2d at 786.
271. See id.
272. 340 Md. 503, 667 A.2d 617 (1995).
273. See id. at 507, 667 A.2d at 618-19.
274. See id. at 508, 667 A.2d at 619.
19981
Baltimore Law Review
The policy in question did not have the Insurance Services Of-
fice (ISO) of America's standard pollution exclusion clause.275 The
pertinent part of Allstate's policy for the Sullinses was an absolute
pollution exclusion clause that read as follows: "we do not cover
bodily injury or property damage which results in any manner from
the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of: a) vapors, fumes,
acids, toxic chemicals, toxic liquids or toxic gasses; b) waste materi-
als or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants. '276 The United
States District Court for the District of Maryland certified to Mary-
land's high court the question whether Allstate had a duty to de-
fend the Sullinses for the lead paint claim in light of the policy's
absolute pollution exclusion clause.
2 77
The court of appeals held that the exclusion clause used in the
homeowners' policy was ambiguous because the terms "contami-
nants" and "pollutants" were "susceptible of two interpretations by
a reasonable prudent layperson."278 In order to resolve the issue of
ambiguity, the court relied on the principles it espoused in Cheney
v. Bell National Life Insurance Co.279 In Cheney, the court of appeals
explained that ambiguity should be dealt with in the following
manner:
275. See Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 102 Md. App. 45,
51-52, 648 A.2d 1047, 1049-50 (1994). The standard ISO pollution exclusion
provides that the policy does not apply to:
bodily injury arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids
or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollu-
tants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body
of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, disper-
sal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Id.
276. Sullins, 340 Md. at 506-07, 667 A.2d at 618.
277. See id. at 506, 667 A.2d at 618. The exact question certified to the court of ap-
peals was:
Whether an insurance company has a duty to defend and/or indem-
nify its insured in an action alleging injury from exposure to lead
paint where the insurance policy excludes coverage for:
bodily injury which results in any manner from the discharge, dis-
persal, release or escape of:
a) vapors, fumes, acids, toxic chemicals, toxic liquids or toxic
gasses;
b) waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants.
Id.
278. Id. at 509, 617 A.2d at 620.
279. 315 Md. 761, 556 A.2d 1135 (1989).
[Vol. 27
Sullins v. Allstate
In the event of an ambiguity . . . extrinsic and parol evi-
dence may be considered. If no extrinsic or parol evidence
is introduced, or if the ambiguity remains after considera-
tion of extrinsic or parol evidence that is introduced, [the
policy] will be construed against the insurer as the drafter
of the instrument.
2 80
The Sullins court construed the policy against the insurer because
the record did not contain any extrinsic evidence to clarify the am-
biguity. 81 The court ruled that the insurer had a duty to defend in
accordance with the potentiality rule.
2 82
The court relied primarily on dictionary definitions and extra-
territorial judicial interpretations in reaching its conclusion that the
terms "contaminant" and "pollutant" were ambiguous.283 The court
viewed contaminant to mean 'something that contaminates' . . . as
'to soil, stain, corrupt, or infect by contact or association' or 'make
inferior or impure by mixture.' 12 84 The court explained that "Web-
ster's Dictionary defines pollutant as 'something that pollutes' and
'pollute' as to 'make physically impure or unclean."' 285
The Sullins court relied primarily on the decision in Atlantic
Mutual Insurance Co. v. McFadden2 86 to find that the exclusion clause
provided no language that would lead a reasonable person to be-
lieve that the clause included lead paint.287 The Sullins court opined
that a broad interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause would
run contrary to the contracting parties' intentions. 28 8 The court of
appeals embraced the notion that pollution exclusion clauses were
not intended for non-environmental pollution, but rather for in-
stances of hazardous waste pollution.
289
280. Id. at 767, 556 A.2d at 1138.
281. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 509, 667 A.2d at 620.
282. See id. at 508, 667 A.2d at 620; see also Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276
Md. 396, 407-08, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975) (discussing the potentiality rule);
supra notes 50-56.
283. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 509-13, 556 A.2d at 620-22.
284. Id. at 510, 667 A.2d at 620 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DiC-
TIONARY 384 (1981)).
285. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1756 (1981)).
286. 595 N.E.2d 762, 764 (Mass. 1992).
287. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 511, 667 A.2d at 620.
288. See id. at 507, 667 A.2d at 619.
289. See id. at 515-16, 667 A.2d at 623. "[T]he [insurance] industry's intention was
to exclude only environmental pollution damage from coverage ..... Id. at
515, 667 A.2d at 622.
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The Sullins court could not distinguish its decision from St.
Leger v. American Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,290 which held that
lead paint fell within the scope of the pollution exclusion clause. 9'
Instead, the Sullins court rejected the St. Leger holding, but noted
that the decision was important because it demonstrated that there
were conflicting judicial opinions on the issue before it.292 The
court of appeals ruled that "conflicting interpretations of policy lan-
guage in judicial opinions is not determinative of, but is a factor to
be considered in determining the existence of ambiguity. 12 93 Ulti-
mately, the court bolstered its finding of ambiguity in the meaning
of the pollution exclusion clause with the fact that courts of differ-
ent jurisdictions have ruled differently when construing the pollu-
tion exclusion clause.
294
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SULL1NS COURT'S RATIONALE
In Sullins, the court of appeals concluded that an absolute pol-
lution exclusion clause only applies "to environmental pollution." 295
This holding is in contrast to the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land's decision in Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. 296 In Bern-
hardt, the court concluded that a pollution exclusion clause ex-
pressed no limitation to industry-related or environmental
incidents. 297 This apparent inconsistency in Maryland law indicates
that insurance counsel may have wiggle room in litigating claims for
injuries that result from household pollution.298
In concluding that the terms "contaminants" and "pollutants"
were ambiguous, the court of appeals engaged in an analysis using
290. 870 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The Sullins court did note, however, that
"[t]he court in St. Leger relied on an unpublished opinion and federal stat-
utes, neither of which is persuasive under Maryland law." Sullins, 340 Md. at
516, 667 A.2d at 623.
291. See id. at 643-44 (holding that an insurer did not have a duty to defend a land-
lord in a lead paint poisoning case).
292. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 516, 667 A.2d at 623.
293. Id. at 518, 667 A.2d at 624.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 515-16, 667 A.2d at 623.
296. 102 Md. App. 45, 648 A.2d 1047 (1994).
297. See id. at 55-56, 648 A.2d at 1051-52.
298. Compare id. at 55, 648 A.2d at 1051 (holding that the release of carbon monox-
ide from a furnace in a home was a pollutant as defined by the absolute pol-
lution exclusion clause), with Sullins, 340 Md. at 516, 667 A.2d at 621-22 (hold-
ing that lead paint in a home was not a pollutant within the meaning of the
absolute pollution exclusion clause).
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dictionary definitions. 299 A judge has a duty to determine whether a
more scientific or legal definition than those provided by a standard
dictionary exist.3°° The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, in discussing a pollution exclusion clause and
the alleged ambiguity therein, aptly recognized that, "if merely ap-
plying a definition in the dictionary suffices to create ambiguity, no
term would be unambiguous. The interpretation of contractual lan-
guage is not mechanical."' °
The Sullins court's decision would have been more persuasive if
the court had relied on statutory definitions of the terms involved
instead of standard dictionary definitions. Relying on statutory defi-
nitions, however, might have led to a different outcome.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act defines a pollutant as "any . . . substance . . .
which after release into the environment and upon exposure ...
will or may reasonably be anticipated to cause death, disease, [or]
behavioral abnormalities." 30 2 Given this statute, the court could have
concluded that lead paint is a pollutant because Congress recog-
nized that "at low levels, lead poisoning in children causes intelli-
gence quotient deficiencies, reading and learning disabilities, im-
paired hearing, reduced attention span, hyperactivity, and behavior
problems. ' 303 Relying upon federal statutes as extrinsic evidence,
Maryland's highest court could have concluded that the Sullinses'
policy did not cover lead paint exposure, and hence, Allstate would
299. See Sullins, 340 Md. at 509-11, 667 A.2d at 620-21. "By one interpretation, these
terms encompass lead paint; by another interpretation, they apply only to
cases of environmental pollution or contamination, and not to products such
as lead paint." Id. at 509, 667 A.2d at 620. At least two Supreme Court Justices
have intimated that judges should not use dictionaries when writing their
opinions and concluding a matter of law. See NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg.,
341 U.S. 322, 326 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Taft-Hartley Act is
not an abstract document to be construed with only the aid of a standard dic-
tionary."); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) (commenting that the dictionary has been termed the "last resort of the
baffled judge").
300. See Highland Park, 341 U.S. at 326 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
301. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cas. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1324 (E.D.
Mich. 1988). Using a dictionary may even help create ambiguity rather than
clarify it. For instance, the noun "ball" has 10 different dictionary definitions.
See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcTIoNARY 105 (3d ed. 1988).
302. Asset Conservation, Lead Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West 1997).
303. Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C.A. §
4851 (West 1995) (Congressional findings).
19981
Baltimore Law Review
have owed no duty to defend.3°4
The Sullins ruling is an apparently logical extension of Mary-
land insurance law and the potentiality rule established by the
Browhawn court. 3 5 The Sullins decision aligns Maryland with those
jurisdictions that hold that lead paint in a household is not a pollu-
tant governed by the pollution exclusion clause. 06
However, the practitioner should note that the Sullins ruling is
limited to lead paint.307 The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled
that lead paint is not within the absolute pollution exclusion
clause. 30 8 This may be a fair ruling based on the insured's expecta-
tions. The duty to defend provides the landlord with the financial
resources of the insurer for lead paint litigation.309
Insurers can negate their coverage for lead paint injuries by
simply including in their policies a clause that would exclude cover-
age for these types of injuries.310 While insurance defense attorneys
should be concerned that the Sullins holding may be applicable to
other household incidents, the Bernhardt case, suggests otherwise.31'
A window may still exist for an insurer to argue that other house-
hold incident are covered under a pollution exclusion clause. This
argument would be reasonable because the Bernhardt court applied
a pollution exclusion clause to a household incident involving car-
bon monoxide poisoning, yet the Sullins court did not overrule
Bernhardt.
312
The Sullins holding is in accord with most jurisdictions and the
trend concerning the pollution exclusion clause's applicability to
304. See St. Leger v. American Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (holding that lead is a pollutant under the Clean Air Act's national
ambient air quality standards), affd, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69 (discussing the potentiality rule).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 226.
307. See Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 518, 667 A.2d 617, 624 (1995).
308. See id.
309. See supra text accompanying note 9.
310. See Chantel v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 338 Md. 131, 656 A.2d 79 (1995)
(acknowledging the trial court's dismissal of one of the insurers involved in
the underlying suit). The insurer's " 'policy clearly had an exclusion for both
indemnification and . . . defense of any lead paint suit [a]nd that was clearly
the understanding between the parties."' Id. at 139, 656 A.2d at 783 (alteration
in original) (quoting the circuit court's order).





lead paint.313 It also stands as a decision that was made in accor-
dance with the tort theory of recovery for damages, as well as one
that was made with the insured's best interest in mind.314 In so hold-
ing, however, the Sullins court seemed more willing to protect the
insured than to apply the law of insurance policy construction. The
Sullins case indicates that the court of appeals may be moving away
from the doctrine set forth in Cheney, toward deciding insurance
policy disputes in accordance with the contra proferentem theory.
35
V. CONCLUSION
The Sullins decision represents a further expansion of both an
insurer's duty to defend and the potentiality rule established in
Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Co.316 The potentiality of coverage
will continue to arise in situations involving ambiguous or vague
pleadings.317 Moreover, the duty to defend is virtually unavoidable,
even when an insurer could prove otherwise through extrinsic evi-
dence.3 8 The Sullins court extended an insurer's duty to defend by
holding that lead paint in a home was not a pollutant within the
meaning of the widely-adopted absolute pollution exclusion
clause.319 In sum, insurance companies that do not wish to defend
for lead paint poisoning cases must do so through "the use of a few




313. See supra notes 226-61.
314. See supra note 77 (discussing the tort theory of recovery for damages).
315. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text. But see Bailer v. Erie Exch. Co.,
344 Md. 515, 522, 687 A.2d 1375, 1378 (1997) (stating that in Maryland "an in-
surance contract will be construed against the insurer only when ambiguity re-
mains after considering" extrinsic and parole evidence).
316. 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975).
317. See id.
318. See supra notes 272-94.
319. See supra notes 272-94.
320. Pepper Indus. v. Home Ins. Co., 134 Cal. Rptr. 904, 908 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977);
see Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 518 n.3, 667 A.2d 617, 624 n.3
(1995) ("To be sure that lead paint poisoning claims were excluded from cov-
erage, Allstate could have included a provision . . . explicitly excluding such
claims.").
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